Blog Jay Leiderman Law

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Jury instructions relieving States of this burden violate a defendant’s XIV Amendment due process rights. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Such directions subvert the presumption of innocence accorded to accused persons and also invade the truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases.” Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265. Jury instructions which tell a jury that an element has been met already fall under a category of Due Process violations.  Thus, the verdicts are infirm as to all the counts of 261(a)(3) involving the victim. Since those counts led to the imposition of a sentence of years in prison, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

due process

The 14th Amendment extended the rights to due process and equal protection to the states

 

The Constitution states only one command twice. The Fifth Amendment says to the federal government that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses the same eleven words, called the Due Process Clause, to describe a legal obligation of all states. These words have as their central promise an assurance that all levels of American government must operate within the law (“legality”) and provide fair procedures. Most of this essay concerns that promise. We should briefly note, however, three other uses these words have had in American constitutional law.

no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Incorporation

The Fifth Amendment’s reference to “due process” is only one of many promises of protection the Bill of Rights gives citizens against the federal government. Originally these promises had no application at all against the states. Did the Fourteenth Amend­ment change that? In the middle of the Twentieth Century, about a century after its adoption, a series of Supreme Court decisions found that the Due Process Clause “incorporated” most of the important elements of the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to the states. These decisions almost obliterated any difference between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. If a Bill of Rights guarantee is “incorporated” in the “due process” requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, state and federal obligations are exactly the same. The right to a jury trial, to take just one example, means the same in state and federal courts; there are no differences about the number of jurors required, whether they have to be unanimous in their verdicts, and so forth.

Read more of this article on due process here.

Due Process

 

 

 

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139 Comments

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  • sea tac says:

    Criminal Jury Instructions Resource Center – jury instructions
    http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/312.htmUse of these instructions is subject to rule (2.1050(e).) of the California Rules of Court. Key projects of the Criminal Jury Instructions Advisory Committee are outlined in the annual agenda.

  • Sean says:

    Jury Instructions For Judges and Attorneys – jury instructions
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    Plain Language Civil and Criminal Jury Instructions. Home. Home · Criminal Jury Instructions Resource Center · Civil Jury Instructions Resource Center.

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    http://www.eurasiareview.com/13112012-teenager-who-took-down-cia-gov-gets-6-years-prob...By RT November 13, 2012 … could have locked him up for three years straight and then released him on juvenile parole,” attorney Jay Leiderman tells Wired.

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  • baby says:

    “Testify” by Common

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    “Before you lock my love away, before you lock my love away
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    “Fear in her chest her face in tears, had her mans back he was facing years
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    “The judge called for order the court reporter makin her words shorter
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    They arrested him for murder, and gun possession
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    “Before you lock my love away, before you lock my love away
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    “The court awaited as the foreman got the verdict from the bailiff
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    Section 2.

    The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;–to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;–to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;–to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;–to controversies between two or more states;–between a state and citizens of another state;–between citizens of different states;–between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

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    due process of law
    n. a fundamental principle of fairness in all legal matters, both civil and criminal, especially in the courts. All legal procedures set by statute and court practice, including notice of rights, must be followed for each individual so that no prejudicial or unequal treatment will result. While somewhat indefinite, the term can be gauged by its aim to safeguard both private and public rights against unfairness. The universal guarantee of due process is in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and is applied to all states by the 14th Amendment. From this basic principle flows many legal decisions determining both procedural and substantive rights.

  • crNer says:

    The Fifth Amendment says to the federal government that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses the same eleven words, called the Due Process Clause, to describe a legal obligation of all states.

  • btBlunc says:

    DEFINING CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
    The first clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment defines citizenship:

    All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
    The definition looks pretty straightforward, but it isn’t. Here’s why:

    United States citizenship is based on birthright rather than on the “right of blood.” Birthright citizenship means that citizenship depends on where a person is born rather than who his or her parents are.

    The birthright basis of U.S. citizenship was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1898. This ruling was made in the case of Wong Kim Ark, who was born in the United States to Chinese noncitizen parents. The court decided that he was a U.S. citizen even though his parents were not.

    Chief Justice Melville Fuller in his dissenting opinion in Wong’s case put his finger on a problem with the birthright rule: “It is unreasonable to conclude that ‘natural born citizen’ applied to everybody born within the geographical tract known as the United States, irrespective of circumstances; and that the children of foreigners, happening to be born to them while passing through the country . . . were eligible to the presidency, while children of our citizens, born abroad, were not.”

    The definition of citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment is very different from what it would have been at the time when the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791. Back then, not everybody who was born in the United States “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” was a citizen, because slaves were not recognized as citizens even though most of them had been born in the United States.

    This definition of citizenship contains a twofold test. To be a citizen you have to be “born or naturalized in the United States” and “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Let’s see how that pans out in practice:

    The children of U.S. citizens are automatically citizens if they are born in the United States.

    Laws passed by Congress have also given automatic U.S. citizenship to children born outside the United States, provided at least one of their parents is a U.S. citizen — even if they are born out of wedlock. (Precise conditions vary according to the dates of birth of the children concerned.)

    Any child under 18 who has been adopted by a U.S. citizen gets citizenship immediately on arrival in the United States under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000.

    The children of aliens who are lawfully in the United States are automatically U.S. citizens — provided the children are born in the United States.

    What about the children of illegal aliens? The law is clear on this point. All children born in the United States are U.S. citizens, regardless of their parents’ legal status. But this law is not universally popular among Americans.

    Where does “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” come in? This provision excludes the children of foreign diplomats from becoming U.S. citizens, even if they are born in the United States. Don’t foreign diplomats and their kids have to obey U.S. law while they’re in the United States? No. The best evidence of their privileged position is the mountain of parking and speeding tickets that diplomats and their families are allowed to ignore every year.

    What about disloyal citizens? Can they be stripped of their citizenship on the ground that they have rejected the jurisdiction of the United States? No. In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case involving Yaser Hamdi. Hamdi was allegedly fighting on the side of the Taliban when he was captured in Afghanistan in 2001.

    Could the U.S. government hold him in Guantanamo Bay and deny him due process as an “illegal enemy combatant”? No, said the Supreme Court, because he was a U.S. citizen. He was born in the United States and raised in Saudi Arabia, of which he was also a citizen. Faced with a judicial brick wall, the U.S. government made a deal with Hamdi. In return for his release, Hamdi gave up his U.S. citizenship and promised to live permanently in Saudi Arabia.

  • oxhib says:

    [1] 8 U.S.C. § 1401.

    [2] http://www.rasmussenreports.com/2005/Immigration%20November%207.htm.

    [3] Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring); John C. Eastman s Edwin Meese III, Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03–6696 (Eastman/Meese Brief) (see also http://www.fed-soc. org/pdf/birthright.pdf; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm18.cfm); Charles Wood, Losing Control of America’s Future, 22 Harv. J.L. s Pub. Pol’y 465, 503–22 (1999); Peter Schuck s Rogers Smith, Citizenship Without Consent (1985).

    [4] E.g., H.R. 698; H.R. 3700, § 201; H.R. 3938, § 701; Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (“2005 House Hearing”). In March, Senator Tom Coburn circulated an amendment in committee to repeal birthright citizenship (a vote was never taken), while Senator Charles Schumer, a proponent of birthright citizenship, asked now Justice Samuel A. Alito for his views during his confirmation hearings.[1]

    [5] E.g., S. 1351, 103rd Cong., § 1001 (1993); 139 Cong. Rec. 21709–12 (1993) (Sen. Reid); H.R. 3862, 103rd Cong., § 401 (1994); Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the United States to Illegal Alien Parents: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995); Citizenship Reform Act of 1997; and Voter Eligibility Verification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).

    [6] E.g., James C. Ho, President Schwarzenegger – Or At Least Hughes?,

    [7]Green Bag 2d 108 (2004). 7 Constitutional amendments repealing birthright citizenship have been proposed. H.J. Res. 41, 109th Cong. (2005); H.J. Res. 64, 104th Cong. (1995). See also Michael Sandler, Toward a More Perfect Definition of ‘Citizen’, CQ Weekly, Feb. 13, 2006, at 388 (quoting Rep. Mark Foley, who supports repeal by constitutional amendment: “My view is the 14th Amendment was rather certain in its application … . Legislatively, I still am not comfortable with [the statutory approach]. I think a court could strike it down.”).

    [8] E.g., Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ jurisdiction” as “[a] government’s general power to exercise authority.”

    [9] Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002) (respecting recreational boats “subject to [the] jurisdiction” of the Coast Guard); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 544 (2001) (respecting electronic communications media “subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC”).

    [10] Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 445 (2004) (respecting government officials “subject to [the] habeas jurisdiction” of a particular court).

    [11] Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2194–95 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The statement was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, and no justice took issue with it.

    [12] Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1329–31 (11th Cir. 1984).

    [13] United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553–58 (E.D. Va. 2002).

    [14] Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).

    [15] Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 164 (1830) (Story, J.) (“[n]othing is better settled at the common law” than jus soli); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandford Ch. 583, 646 (N.Y. 1844); Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 Yale J. L. s Humanities 73, 138–40 (1997).

    [16] Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

    [17] Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 n.15 (1999); In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 909–10 (C.C. D. Cal. 1884).

    [18] Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (1866).

    [19] Id. at 2869, 2890–97.

    [20] Id. at 3042, 3149.

    [21] Id. at 2890 (emphasis added).

    [22] Space constraints, if nothing else, prevent me from quoting Cowan’s racially charged remarks here in full, but see id. at 2890–91.

    [23] Id. at 2891. Like Cowan, Conness also had bad things to say about the Chinese. Id. at 2891–92. But to his credit, Conness at least recognized their need for civil rights protections. Id. at 2892.

    [24] Id. at 2890, 2895 (Sen. Howard); id. at 2893, 2894 (Sen. Trumbull) (emphasis added).

    [25] Id. at 2893–94 (Sen. Johnson); id. at 2894–95 (Sen. Hendricks).

    [26] Id. at 2890, 2892–93, 2897.

    [27] Only Willard Saulsbury, Sr. (D-DE) expressed disagreement. Id. at 2897.

    [28] Id. at 2897.

    [29] Smith s Lungren; 2005 House Hearing at 3 (Rep. L. Smith); John C. Eastman, Constitution’s Citizenship Clause Misread, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 2005, at A19; John C. Eastman, Citizens by Right, or by Consent?, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 2, 2006, at B9.

    [30] Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2891 (emphasis added).

    [31] Id. at 2893. See also id. at 2895 (Sen. Hendricks) (if “[w]e can make [a person] obey our laws, … being liable to such obedience he is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”).

    [32] 14 Stat. 27, § 1 (emphasis added).

    [33] Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 498. Moreover, as John Eastman (a leading repeal proponent) has conceded, the Fourteenth Amendment’s positively phrased text (“subject to … jurisdiction”) “might easily have been intended to describe a broader grant of citizenship than the negatively-phrased language from the 1866 Act” (“not subject to any foreign power”). 2005 House Hearing at 63; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm18.cfm. Eastman cites the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate the gap – suggesting that the Act does little work for repeal proponents.

    [34] Edward J. Erler, From Subjects to Citizens: The Social Compact Origins of American Citizenship, in The American Founding and the Social Compact 163–97 (2003).

    [35] Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972) (“Until 1875 alien migration to the United States was unrestricted.”).

    [36] 169 U.S. 649, 652–53.

    [37] Id. at 693–94 (emphasis added); see also id. at 682.

    [38] The Heritage Guide to the Constitution 385 (2005) (“Wong Kim Ark is certainly broad enough to include the children born in the United States of illegal … immigrants”).

    [39] 457 U.S. 202, 211 s n.10 (1982) (quoting Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693) (emphasis added); see also 457 U.S. at 215.

    [40] Id. at 243 (emphasis added).

    [41] 471 U.S. 444, 446. Cf. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (upholding Attorney General’s discretion not to suspend deportation for illegal aliens despite hardship for their U.S. citizen children); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (“[T]he Court [has] held its processes available to ‘an alien who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here.’”) (quoting Yamatayo v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903)).

    [42] 542 U.S. 507, 510; Eastman/Meese Brief (cited in note 4). Repeal proponents hasten to note that, in dissent, Justices Scalia and Stevens referred to Hamdi as a “presumed” U.S. citizen. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 2005 House Hearing at 61 (Prof. Eastman). But citizenship was likely “presumed” only because Hamdi might have renounced citizenship through his hostile conduct. 8 U.S.C. § 1481; Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. at 906. In fact, Hamdi subsequently did renounce his citizenship, through a plea agreement that also reserved the possibility that he had renounced citizenship at an earlier time. http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ hamdi/91704stlagrmnt.html (paragraph 8). It is difficult in any event to believe that Justice Stevens, a member of the Plyler majority, agrees with repeal proponents.

    [43] 83 U.S. 36, 73 (emphasis added). This statement is awkward; why bother singling out “ministers” and “consuls,” if all “citizens or subjects of foreign States” are excluded? Compare note 29 and accompanying text.

    [44] 88 U.S. 162, 167–68 (1874).

    [45] 21 F. 905.

    [46] 169 U.S. at 678.

    [47] 112 U.S. 94, 101–2.

    [48] Legislation Denying Citizenship at Birth to Certain Children Born in the United States, 19 Op. O.L.C. 340 (1995); see also Citizenship of Children Born in the United States of Alien Parents, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 328, 328–29 (1862) (analyzing pre-Fourteenth Amendment common law); Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 396–97 (1862) (same). See generally http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,0502- endelman.shtm (collecting authorities in footnotes 21 and 27).

    [49] What about foreign governments? If “[n]early every industrialized country in the world requires at least one parent to be a citizen or legal immigrant before a child born there becomes a citizen,” House Hearing at 3 (Rep. Smith), perhaps repeal proponents should demand that the Citizenship Clause be construed in light of foreign law and international consensus. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting various conservative foreign rulings not cited by the Court).

    [50] Lynn Woolley, Myths, Realities of the 14th Amendment, Human Events Online, Mar. 7, 2006, available at http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=13010.

  • ovNer says:

    Whatever the correct legal answer to the question of Indian tribes, it is clearly beside the point. The status of Indian tribes under U.S. law may have been ambiguous to members of the 39th Congress. But there is no doubt that foreign countries enjoy no such sovereign status within U.S. borders. And there is likewise no doubt that U.S. law applies to their nationals who enter U.S. territory.

    Repeal proponents contend that history supports their position. First, they quote Howard’s introductory remarks to state that birthright citizenship “will not, of course, include … foreigners.”[29] But that reads Howard’s reference to “aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers” out of the sentence. It also renders completely meaningless the subsequent dialogue between Senators Cowan and Conness over the wisdom of extending birthright citizenship to the children of Chinese immigrants and Gypsies.

  • ryBlunc says:

    Senators Reverdy Johnson (D-MD) and Thomas Hendricks (D-IN) disagreed, contending that the U.S. could extend its laws to Indian tribes and had done so on occasion.[25] Senator James R. Doolittle (R-WI) proposed to put all doubt to rest by adding the words “excluding Indians not taxed” (borrowing from language in Article I) to the Howard amendment.[26] But although there was virtual consensus that birthright citizenship should not be extended to the children of Indian tribal members,[27] a majority of Senators saw no need for clarification. The Senate ultimately defeated Doolittle’s amendment by a 10–30 vote, and then adopted the Howard text without recorded vote.[28]

  • ugLix says:

    No Senator took issue with the consensus interpretation adopted by Howard, Cowan, and Conness. To be sure, one interpretive dispute did arise. Senators disagreed over whether the Howard amendment would extend birthright citizenship to the children of Indians. For although Indian tribes resided within U.S. territory, weren’t they also sovereign entities not subject to the jurisdiction of Congress?

    Whatever the correct legal answer to the question of Indian tribes, it is clearly beside the point.
    Some Senators clearly thought so. Howard urged that Indian tribes “always have been in our legislation and jurisprudence, as being quasi foreign nations” and thus could not be deemed subject to U.S. law. Senator Lyman Trumbull (D-IL) agreed, noting that “it would be a violation of our treaty obligations … to extend our laws over these Indian tribes with whom we have made treaties saying we would not do it.” Trumbull insisted that Indian tribes “are not subject to our jurisdiction in the sense of owing allegiance solely to the United States,” for “[i]t is only those persons who come completely within our jurisdiction, who are subject to our laws, that we think of making citizens.”[24]

  • xfhib says:

    In response, proponents of the Howard amendment endorsed Cowan’s interpretation. Senator John Conness (R-CA) responded specifically to Cowan’s concerns about extending birthright citizenship to the children of Chinese immigrants:

    “The proposition before us … relates simply in that respect to the children begotten of Chinese parents in California, and it is proposed to declare that they shall be citizens. … I am in favor of doing so. … We are entirely ready to accept the provision proposed in this constitutional amendment, that the children born here of Mongolian parents shall be declared by the Constitution of the United States to be entitled to civil rights and to equal protection before the law with others.”

    Conness acknowledged Cowan’s dire predictions of foreign overpopulation, but explained that, although legally correct, Cowan’s parade of horribles would not be realized, because most Chinese would not take advantage of such rights although entitled to them. He noted that most Chinese work and then return to their home countries, rather than start families in the U.S. Conness thus concluded that, if Cowan “knew as much of the Chinese and their habits as he professes to do of the Gypsies, … he would not be alarmed.”[23]

  • xoBlunc says:

    Senator Edgar Cowan (R-PA) – who would later vote against the entire constitutional amendment anyway – was the first to speak in opposition to extending birthright citizenship to the children of foreigners. Cowan declared that, “if [a state] were overrun by another and a different race, it would have the right to absolutely expel them.” He feared that the Howard amendment would effectively deprive states of the authority to expel persons of different races – in particular, the Gypsies in his home state of Pennsylvania and the Chinese in California – by granting their children citizenship and thereby enabling foreign populations to overrun the country. Cowan objected especially to granting birthright citizenship to the children of aliens who “owe [the U.S.] no allegiance [and] who pretend to owe none,” and to those who regularly commit “trespass” within the U.S.[22]

  • zphowl says:

    Senator Howard’s brief introduction of his amendment confirmed its plain meaning:

    “Mr. HOWARD. … This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons.”[21]
    This understanding was universally adopted by other Senators. Howard’s colleagues vigorously debated the wisdom of his amendment – indeed, some opposed it precisely because they opposed extending birthright citizenship to the children of aliens of different races. But no Senator disputed the meaning of the amendment with respect to alien children.

  • tdBlunc says:

    This conclusion is confirmed by history. The Citizenship Clause was no legal innovation. It simply restored the longstanding English common law doctrine of jus soli, or citizenship by place of birth.[14] Although the doctrine was initially embraced in early American jurisprudence,[15] the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated jus soli in its infamous Dred Scott decision, denying birthright citizenship to the descendents of slaves.[16] Congress approved the Citizenship Clause to overrule Dred Scott and elevate jus soli to the status of constitutional law.[17]

    When the House of Representatives first approved the measure that would eventually become the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not contain language guaranteeing citizenship.[18] On May 29, 1866, six days after the Senate began its deliberations, Senator Jacob Howard (R-MI) proposed language pertaining to citizenship. Following extended debate the next day, the Senate adopted Howard’s language.[19] Both chambers subsequently approved the constitutional amendment without further discussion of birthright citizenship,[20] so the May 30, 1866 Senate debate offers the best insight into Congressional intent.

  • xyhib says:

    Foreign diplomats enjoy diplomatic immunity,[12] while lawful enemy combatants enjoy combatant immunity.[13] Accordingly, children born to them are not entitled to birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.

  • pcLix says:

    Accordingly, the text of the Citizenship Clause plainly guarantees birthright citizenship to the U.S.-born children of all persons subject to U.S. sovereign authority and laws. The clause thus covers the vast majority of lawful and unlawful aliens. Of course, the jurisdictional requirement of the Citizenship Clause must do something – and it does. It excludes those persons who, for some reason, are immune from, and thus not required to obey, U.S. law. Most notably, foreign diplomats and enemy soldiers – as agents of a foreign sovereign – are not subject to U.S. law, notwithstanding their presence within U.S. territory.

  • nphowl says:

    Common usage confirms this understanding. When we speak of a business that is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency, it must follow the laws of that agency, whether it likes it or not.[9] When we speak of an individual who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court, he must follow the judgments and orders of that court, whether he likes it or not.[10] As Justice Scalia noted just a year ago, when a statute renders a particular class of persons “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” Congress “has made clear its intent to extend its laws” to them.[11]

    Of course, when we speak of a person who is subject to our jurisdiction, we do not limit ourselves to only those who have sworn allegiance to the U.S. Howard Stern need not swear allegiance to the FCC to be bound by Commission orders. Nor is being “subject to the jurisdiction” of the U.S. limited to those who have always complied with U.S. law. Criminals cannot immunize themselves from prosecution by violating Title 18. Likewise, aliens cannot immunize themselves from U.S. law by entering our country in violation of Title 8. Indeed, illegal aliens are such because they are subject to U.S. law.

  • spLix says:

    We begin, of course, with the text of the Citizenship Clause. To be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the U.S. is simply to be subject to the authority of the U.S. government.[8] The phrase thus covers the vast majority of persons within our borders who are required to obey U.S. laws. And obedience, of course, does not turn on immigration status, national allegiance, or past compliance. All must obey.

  • cvhib says:

    On one side, supporters of birthright citizenship argue it was established by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, and settled by the Supreme Court in 1898, when it held that children born in the United States, even to parents not eligible to become citizens, were nonetheless citizens themselves under that amendment.
    The language of the 14th Amendment by itself seems unambiguous:
    “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.”
    But let’s deconstruct that clause: Anyone [Born Here], plus [“Subject to Jurisdiction Thereof”]. The “being born here” part is clear, but what about the additional requirement of being “subject to jurisdiction [of the U.S.]”?
    That jurisdictional requirement of the citizenship clause is something you might just read over — maybe because you got the gist of it at the “born” part of the clause, and just stopped reading. But it’s there.

    http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/18/opinions/cevallos-trump-14th-amendment/

  • yoartef says:

    OVERVIEW

    The 14th amendment is a very important amendment that defines what it means to be a US citizen and protects certain rights of the people. There are three important “clauses” in the 14th amendment, each of which are still important today. A clause is a sentence in any part of our constitution.

    Citizenship Clause – the citizenship clause gives individual born in the United States, but especially at that time, African Americans the right to citizenship. Before the 14th amendment, African Americans could not become citizens and this limited the rights of those that were able to escape slavery and become free. This clause allows all people born in the United States to be US citizens. Although this right was established by the Civil Rights of 1866, this amendment made the law permanent as many feared that the law could be overturned and take away the citizenship of African Americans. Later on, the Supreme Court protected this right for the children of immigrants and the right of Native Americans to become citizens also was protected later on.

    Once you have American citizenship, it cannot be taken from you by Congress or other authorities, unless you lie to government during the process to get US citizenship. Otherwise, everyone that becomes an American citizen stays an American citizen, unless they give it up themselves.

    Due Process Clause – the due process clause protects the 1st amendment rights of the people and prevents those rights from being taken away by any government without “due process.” Due process is a trial by jury for all people accused of wrongdoing. Although you may think the 1st amendment already protects these rights, the 14th amendment specially enforces the Bill of Rights on the states, to make sure that they can never limit the rights of Americans without fairness. There were also a number of rights that are protected for those that are accused of a crime but have not been proven to do anything wrong yet.

    Equal Protection Clause – This part of the fourteenth amendment states that there may be no discrimination against them by the law. The federal government enforces this protection on the states, ensuring that they do not. Remember that the Bill of Rights protects some rights for Americans. The equal protection clause extended this protection to the state governments. This clause of the 14th amendment would later be used to end discrimination and segregation in the South.

    The 14th amendment was important in bring the Confederacy back into the United States after the Civil War. The US took responsibility for the pensions for soldier that had fought in the war and refused to take on the Confederate debts, while also preventing former Confederate leaders from holding elected office or civil positions. Section 3 of the amendment allowed some of these leaders to regain their posts if 2/3 of the state legislatures voted to allow it. The 14th amendment also ensured that debts due to the emancipation of slaves were “null and void” (not allowed).

  • qtLix says:

    TEXT OF 14th AMENDMENT

    AMENDMENT XIV

    SECTION 1.

    All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

    SECTION 2.

    Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.

    SECTION 3.

    No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

    SECTION 4.

    The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

    SECTION 5.

    The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

  • ujhib says:

    U.S. Constitution
    14th Amendment
    The Fourteenth Amendment addresses many aspects of citizenship and the rights of citizens. The most commonly used — and frequently litigated — phrase in the amendment is “equal protection of the laws”, which figures prominently in a wide variety of landmark cases, including Brown v. Board of Education (racial discrimination), Roe v. Wade (reproductive rights), Bush v. Gore (election recounts), Reed v. Reed (gender discrimination), and University of California v. Bakke (racial quotas in education). See more…
    Amendment XIV

    Section 1.

    All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

    Section 2.

    Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.

    Section 3.

    No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

    Section 4.

    The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

    Section 5.

    The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

  • vphowl says:

    14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Civil Rights (1868)

    Following the Civil War, Congress submitted to the states three amendments as part of its Reconstruction program to guarantee equal civil and legal rights to black citizens. The major provision of the 14th amendment was to grant citizenship to “All persons born or naturalized in the United States,” thereby granting citizenship to former slaves. Another equally important provision was the statement that “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The right to due process of law and equal protection of the law now applied to both the Federal and state governments. On June 16, 1866, the House Joint Resolution proposing the 14th amendment to the Constitution was submitted to the states. On July 28, 1868, the 14th amendment was declared, in a certificate of the Secretary of State, ratified by the necessary 28 of the 37 States, and became part of the supreme law of the land.

    Congressman John A. Bingham of Ohio, the primary author of the first section of the 14th amendment, intended that the amendment also nationalize the Federal Bill of Rights by making it binding upon the states. Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, introducing the amendment, specifically stated that the privileges and immunities clause would extend to the states “the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments.” Historians disagree on how widely Bingham’s and Howard’s views were shared at the time in the Congress, or across the country in general. No one in Congress explicitly contradicted their view of the Amendment, but only a few members said anything at all about its meaning on this issue. For many years, the Supreme Court ruled that the Amendment did not extend the Bill of Rights to the states.

    Not only did the 14th amendment fail to extend the Bill of Rights to the states; it also failed to protect the rights of black citizens. One legacy of Reconstruction was the determined struggle of black and white citizens to make the promise of the 14th amendment a reality. Citizens petitioned and initiated court cases, Congress enacted legislation, and the executive branch attempted to enforce measures that would guard all citizens’ rights. While these citizens did not succeed in empowering the 14th amendment during the Reconstruction, they effectively articulated arguments and offered dissenting opinions that would be the basis for change in the 20th century.

    (Information excerpted from Teaching With Documents [Washington, DC: The National Archives and Records Administration and the National Council for the Social Studies, 1998] p. 40.)

  • ywhib says:

    Enforcement Clause

    The Enforcement Clause grants Congress the power to pass laws that make Sections One through Four of the Fourteenth Amendment effective. One of the limitations on the Enforcement Clause is that Congress is only permitted to enforce the provision through appropriate legislation. In Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), the Supreme Court’s ruling suggested that Congress could define the substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, but this reading has been rejected by more recent opinions. In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Court ruled that Congress did not have the power to legislative against discrimination by private individuals because Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to actions committed by a state or state agents. Congress is allowed to pass legislation prohibiting state actions that generally violate the Fourteenth Amendment even if they do not always. In Oregon v. Mitchell (1970), there was a challenge to Congress banning literacy tests for voting. The ban was upheld by the Court because they determined that literacy tests tended to be abused so often that they should be completely banned. Furthermore, in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the Supreme Court declared the Religious Freedom of Religion Act, where Congress tried to use the Enforcement Clause to overturn an earlier Court decision regarding the Free Exercise Clause, was unconstitutional. If Congress wants to enact its power under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the legislation they are proposing needs to remedy or prevent actions that are prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.

  • nnLix says:

    Debt

    The fourth section of the Fourteenth Amendment involved making the national debt sacrosanct and repudiating Confederate debt. In Branch v. Haas (1883), federal courts decided that contracts involving Confederate debt would not be enforced although contracts that involve Confederate currency are enforceable to prevent injustice to those who were required to accept them during the Civil War. The issue of the repudiation of the United States’ debt came up again in the Gold Clause Cases (1935). In those cases, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its authority by refusing to pay bonds in gold, but they could not recover because the damage was only nominal.

  • vdartef says:

    Disqualification for Rebellion

    One of the most controversial sections of the Fourteenth Amendment was Section Three, which disqualified the former rebels from serving as state or federal officials. Some saw it as vindictive action against these individuals. The clause was also tempered from the initial wording. Although the clause was written in the context of the Civil War, it would still apply for future rebellions.

  • iqedehoyoced says:

    Apportionment

    Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment deals with apportionment of representatives from the southern states. The abolition of slavery meant that the representation of the former slave in the House of Representatives increased. This clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted to encourage Southern states to grant blacks the right to vote without forcing them to do so. Congress did not really try to enforce the clause. In Saunders v. Wilkins (1945), a candidate for Congress from Virginia sued under Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment trying to force the state to adopt an at-large electoral system because the state was not eligible for the nine electoral seats it had been granted after the 1940 census according to the poll tax. The Court dismissed the case as a political question. This section is still in operation and would operate in future cases of rebellion. The Supreme Court affirmed in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) that under Section Two, states can prohibit convicted felons from voting after serving their prison sentence.

  • atejaxir says:

    Although the Court has used the Equal Protection Clause to strike down laws relating to voting and access to justice, they have refused to extend it to provide a certain level of welfare, housing, or education to all citizens. The Court refused to strike down Maryland’s method of calculating welfare benefits to large families in Dandrige v. Williams (1970) despite arguments that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court in San Antonio v. Rodriquez (1973) ruled that Texas’s method of funding public schools through property taxes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause even though this resulted in more money being spent per pupil in richer school districts. The decision in Rodriquez demonstrated the Court’s intention that the Equal Protection Clause would be confined to rights implicitly or explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. The Court’s decision along this line can be seen in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools (1988) where it determined that a school district charging parents part of the cost for transportation by bus to the public school was not a violation of equal protection of the laws.

  • ubilinem says:

    The right to vote is another fundamental right, which the Court has chosen to apply strict scrutiny, although in practice it is not as stringent as the standard applied in suspect classification cases. Reynolds v. Sims (1964) involved a challenge to Alabama’s misapportionment scheme. The state’s program gave rural voters more representatives per capita than it gave urban voters, which the Court ruled violated the Equal Protection Clause. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Election (1966), the Supreme Court struck down a state tax that required voters to pay a small amount to vote in state elections. Strict scrutiny was also used in Kramer v. Union Free School District (1969) to invalidate a state voting restriction that only allowed persons who owned or leased property in a school district or had children who attended school in that district to vote in school board elections. The Supreme Court decided the controversial case Bush v. Gore in 2000, ending the recount of votes in Florida, although most of the judges agreed that there was a problem with Florida’s use of different counting polices in various counties. In 2008, The Court upheld in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board a strict voter identification law that required voters to present a passport, driver’s license, or state-issued photo identification card.

  • oliriyxqe says:

    Furthermore, the Court also struck down a fee for parents who are looking for judicial review of a decision terminating parental rights in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996). In M.L.B., the Supreme Court determined that the savings to the state was not enough to justify the burden it imposed on individuals who are facing losing their parental rights. In Griffin v. Illinois (1956), the Court decided that states must provide free court transcripts to indigents and to provide free lawyers to indigents who are appealing criminal convictions in Douglas v. California (1963). Additionally, the Court ruled in 1985 in the case Ake v. Oklahoma that free psychiatric assistance has to be provided to indigent defendants when significant evidence of mental illness is available that could assist in his defense.

  • urlowerab says:

    Classifications based on wealth have only been granted a rational basis review. Generally, the government just needs to show that the law is rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest. However, a higher level of scrutiny might be used if the government has placed a financial burden on individuals trying to exercise their fundamental rights. In Harper v. State Board of Elections (1966), the Supreme Court struck down state laws that impose poll taxes on voters. Other state laws that were struck down include legislation imposing large fees for getting one’s name listed on a public office ballot in Bullock v. Carter (1972) and a filing fee for individuals trying to get a divorce in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971).

  • uezopuaf says:

    In addition to education cases, the Court also heard cases involving set-aside programs where government money was put aside for minority contractors when it came to government building projects. In Richmond v. J.R. Croson (1989), the Supreme Court made it clear that such government set-asides are only acceptable to address past racial discrimination if it was the government entity implementing the set-aside that committed the discrimination.

  • oxartef says:

    The Supreme Court revisited the issue again in Fisher v. University of Texas (2013) when it reviewed a challenge to the university using race as part of a two-pronged admission process. The first prong was race blind and automatically admitted the top 10% of Texas high school classes. The Court took a firmer stance ruling that the lower courts erred in not applying strict scrutiny to the university’s policy. After the Supreme Court struck down the University of Michigan’s admission policy in Grutter, the state’s voters passed a constitutional amendment that prohibited racial preferences in school admissions. The constitutional amendment was challenged in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (2014) as groups argued that using a constitutional amendment instead of allowing the issue to be more easily reversed in state legislature was a violation of Equal Protection. The Court’s decision affirmed the right of state voters to decide whether they want to extend racial preferences in admissions.

  • ophowl says:

    The flip side of the issue of classifications based on race is the question of whether the government can constitutionally do so to benefit minorities that were previously discriminated against. The first case that came before the Supreme Court was Bakke v. Regents Univ. of California (1978) where a white applicant claimed that he was denied admission to medical school even though his scores were significantly better than minority applicants. Although the Court ruled for Bakke because the school had a two-track admission system, Powell’s concurring opinion indicated that racial diversity in higher education was a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court heard a challenge to the University of Michigan’s admission practice, which automatically awarded points to underrepresented minorities, in Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) and ruled that it was unconstitutional because of the overly automatic system. The same year, the Court also decided a case regarding the University of Michigan law school, Grutter v. Bollinger, ruling that universities could use race as a component in determining admissions, although it narrowly upheld the university’s policy. The Supreme Court decided two cases in 2007, Meredith v. Jefferson County and Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools, where it struck down programs that took into account the race of students when assigning them to schools in order to create racially balanced student bodies.

  • ifhib says:

    In Washington v. Davis (1976), Davis challenged the city’s practice of making police force applicants pass a verbal skills test. Due to their better performance, whites comprised 60% of those who passed the test even though they were only 40% of the applicants. The Court decided that unless there was proof that the city used the test because they wanted to discriminate against black applicants then they only needed to show they had a rational basis for using the test. The Supreme Court set out a standard that plaintiffs have to meet to prove a discriminatory purpose in Arlington Heights v. MHDC (1977). Arlington Heights says that to establish a prima facie case of an equal protection violation, the plaintiff has to show that discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision, which can be done with legislative history, departure from usual procedures, or legislative history. After this has been shown, the burden shifts to the city to demonstrate that they would have reached the same result without the discriminatory motive. The case Batson v. Kentucky (1986) established that excluding a potential juror due to race is an Equal Protection violation, but this can be difficult to prove in practice

  • kcLix says:

    There is also a different standard of scrutiny applied by the Court to classifications made by the federal government. In Matthews v. Diaz (1976), a less strict standard was applied when the Court upheld a law that required non-citizens to reside in the country for five continuous years before they would be eligible for federal medical insurance.

  • uaartef says:

    Although strict scrutiny was used in these earlier cases, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the rule of treating alienage classification as requiring strict scrutiny. Starting in the late 1970s, the Court decided the rational basis test should be applied when the classification involves the operation of the state as a government entity. The Supreme Court used the rational basis to uphold state laws that prohibited non-citizens from becoming police officers and parole officers. In Ambach v. Norwick (1978), the Court upheld a law that required school teachers to be citizens because of their role in instilling American values in children and their governmental role. The Court did establish a limit to this exception in Bernal v. Fainter (1984) where they overturned a state law that required notary publics to be citizens.

  • dahib says:

    As noted, alienage is sometimes a protected class. The Equal Protection Clause does not distinguish between the citizens and non-citizens, which brings up the questions of what level of judicial scrutiny should be used when laws are passed treating the citizens and non-citizens differently. In Graham v. Richardson (1971), the Supreme Court, using a strict scrutiny analysis, struck down a law that made citizenship a condition of paying state welfare. The Court did not find that preserving limited state resources for its citizens was a strong enough justification. Application of Griffiths (1973), the Supreme Court used strict analysis and struck down a law that restricted state bar membership to citizens.

  • ujuevetelo says:

    Sometimes, statutes are neutral on their face, but it is alleged they are applied in a racially discriminatory manner. This is a much harder analysis than the traditional strict scrutiny case. The first case of this type that the Supreme Court heard was Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), which involved a Chinese-American challenging the San Francisco Board of Operator’s decision not to give him a license. Yick Wo claimed discrimination pointing out that the Board gave licenses to 79 out of 80 non-Chinese applicants but denied 199 out of 200 Chinese applicants. Due to the evidence, the Court accepted that this was a prima facie case of discrimination.

  • urilponobue says:

    Race was not always given stricter scrutiny though as seen in segregation cases. In Plessy v. Ferguson, a case involving a Louisiana law that required the segregation of train cars for blacks and whites, the Supreme Court upheld the law. The NAACP started to attack the separate but equal doctrine established by Plessy starting in the 1930s. The Court agreed with the NAACP’s argument that Missouri’s refusal to provide legal education to black students in the state and instead paying to send them to schools in other states denied them equal protection in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938). The Court decided the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954 ruling that racially separated schools are inherently unequal. In Brown II, which was decided in 1955, the Supreme Court outlined a plan for the desegregation of schools, but schools dragged their feet despite the ruling, and a decade later a fraction of the schools were integrated. In Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward Cape (1964), the Court ruled that it violated the Equal Protection clause for a school to close down to prevent from having to integrate.

  • zfLix says:

    The Supreme Court ruled in Chicago, Burlington & Quincey Railroad Co. (1897) that the Due Process Clause demanded that the states provide just compensation when acquiring private property for public use. The Court next decided in Gitlow v. New York (1925) that free speech principles like those in the First Amendment would be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Beginning in the 1940s, the idea that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates provisions of the Bill of Rights gained popularity, so today there tend to be a few notable exceptions. This includes the right to indictment by jury trial in the Fifth Amendment, guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases from the Seventh Amendment, and the Second and Third Amendments. Eventually, other rights that were not in the Bill of Rights were added.

  • lvhib says:

    Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the widespread view was that the Bill of Rights only restricted the federal government, which the Court upheld in the case Barron v. City of Baltimore (1833). Some thought that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was supposed to undo Barron and apply the Bill of Rights to the states. However, after the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), the Supreme Court was stripped of most of its power, so the Bill of Rights would have to be applied to the states some other way.

  • lqartef says:

    Over the years, new fundamental rights protected by under substantive due process have been discovered, including a right to privacy and the right to marry. In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Court ruled that the right to privacy included the right for a married couple to use contraception. The right to privacy was used by the Court in Roe v. Wade (1973) to permit abortion. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) involved a challenge to the constitutionality of several state regulations involving abortion. This seminal case provided the first opportunity for Roe to be overturned, but the Court upheld abortion under a theory of a woman’s rights weighed against a state’s interests. The theory from Casey was extended in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) to include private homosexual acts. The Supreme Court did establish a limit to the doctrine when in Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) it ruled that assisted suicide as not a liberty upheld under the Due Process Clause.

  • sfhib says:

    After the New Deal and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 when the Court started to defer more frequently to Congress on issues of economic legislation the interpretation of the Due Process Clause changed. The first example of the Supreme Court rejecting substantive due process as a reason for reviewing economic legislation was in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937). United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) was a case where the Court decided that as long as economic regulations passed the rational basis test then they would not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court was moving its focus from economic legislation to use heightened scrutiny for other fundamental rights.

  • ivLix says:

    Starting in the late 1800s, the Supreme Court used substantive due process to uphold a number of economic rights. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), the Court held that the right to make contracts was a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Lochner v. New York (1905) was a famous case where the Court struck down a law regulating the hours that bakers could work because it interfered with the right-to-contract doctrine. The Supreme Court continued with the liberty-of-contract doctrine in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C. (1923) by ruling that a minimum wage law for nurses violated the Due Process Clause. The Court also used substantive due process to protect other fundamental rights, such as the right for parents to control the education of children in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).

  • aphowl says:

    Although procedural due process is widely accepted, substantive due process as a concept has been an issue of debate. Modern debate regarding the substantive due process clause tends to limitations on the substance of legislation aside from legislation that affects procedural due process. Some proponents of substantive due process try to tie it to a “law of the land” theory. The first case the Court invalidated under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was Dredd Scott v. Sanford (1857), although the Court did not expand on the clause in the opinion.

  • fshib says:

    The Supreme Court has balanced the interests of the government and the individual to determine what specific due process procedures need to be followed in that particular circumstance. In Mackey v. Montrym (1979), the Court determined that the state could suspend driver’s licenses of individuals who refused to take a breathalyzer test after a car accident. The Supreme Court gave a lot of weight to the state’s interests in keeping drunk drivers off roads as quickly as possible. The Court considered whether the school district could suspend employees without pay until hearings to determine if the employees had violated the district’s rules in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985). The Supreme Court rejected the Board of Education’s argument that it never had to provide a hearing, so it could suspend an employee without pay before a hearing.

  • eeartef says:

    The Supreme Court has tended to define liberty rather broadly and found its base in the Constitution; some of the basic liberties found by the Court include the freedom to travel, freedom from incarceration, freedom from physical violence and forced medical procedures, and freedom to live with and raise children. In order to deprive individuals of basic liberties, the state has to show that they followed due process. Constantineau v. Wisconsin (1971) was a case where it was ruled that an individual had to be afforded a hearing before he or she could be put on a list of “excessive drinkers” put out by the government. However, in Paul v. Davis (1976), the Court found that the government distributing a list of active shoplifters did not deprive those individuals of their basic liberties. The Court found that a state could not transfer an inmate in solitary confinement in a state prison to a mental hospital where the prisoner would undergo behavior modification without affording due process.

  • dkLix says:

    The Due Process Clause guarantees fairness to all individuals. This fairness might require different elements, such as a decision with substantial evidence to support it, an opportunity to be heard, and notice. As a basic rule, the more important the right, the stricter the process must be. The Supreme Court has defined what property and liberty interests are in different cases. In the case Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), the Court decided that an untenured professor had no property interest in his job after the college decided not to renew his contract because this was not a property interest according to the state’s laws.

  • clhib says:

    Procedural due process is the most widely accepted form of due process and required states to follow certain procedures before they can deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property. Although some argue that the Founders meant this list to be illustrative, the Supreme Court interpreted it literally and require an individual to show that the issue concerns their life, liberty, or property.

  • kehib says:

    Due Process Clause

    The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments both contain a Due Process Clause, although the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clauses in both articles as having the same meaning, although this was at first disputed.

  • jphowl says:

    Corfield v. Coryell (1823), an early case concerning the Privileges and Immunities Clause, discussed fundamental rights of all citizens that the clause was meant to protect. However, the view of Justice Washington that was expressed in Corfield was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873). In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court held that the privileges of national citizenship were substantive, but they came about as a result of the federal government, the Constitution, or other laws. The fundamental natural rights were not included, and thus the equality function of the Immunities and Privileges Clause was taken over by the Equal Protection Clause and the substantive functions were taken by the Due Process Clause. Aside from one case that was later overruled, the Supreme Court did not use the Privileges and Immunities Clause as the basis for decisions until 1999 with Saenz v. Roe where California set welfare benefits for new residents at a certain level equal to what their former state provided for the first year of residency in California. The Court decided that part of the right to travel was for new citizens of a state to be treated like other citizens of the state.

  • dominuxe says:

    Privileges and Immunities Clause

    There has been some debate over the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause with several possible original meanings. A question arises as to whether the clause meant that all state laws should be applied equally to its citizens or that state laws should have certain substantive content. The substantive view can be further divided into two categories. One view is that these privileges and immunities include all of the rights in the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights. Thus, this view sees the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause as applying all of the rights in the Constitution to all of the states. Another view is that it only meant to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.

  • iguhanahazo says:

    In a number of cases, the Court has continued to limit state action claims against private individuals. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1974), the Supreme Court ruled that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply when electric utilities stop service to customers. The Court also determined in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks (1978) that there was no Section One liability for a warehouseman selling stored property to make good back payments.

  • nqartef says:

    Two key cases where the Court found there was an entanglement of government and private action were Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority (1961) and Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. (1982). In Burton, the Supreme Court ruled that a restaurant that leased a space in a public parking garage that racially discriminated was state action. The Court decided in Lugar that it was state action when a private entity filed ex parte for a prejudgment attachment of a party’s property, which was carried out by the court clerk and sheriff. The Court also handled a number of cases where racial discrimination by private actors was permitted or enforced by state action, which seemed neutral. In Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), the Supreme Court decided that the judicial enforcement of a private restrictive covenant that prohibited non-Caucasian occupants violated equal protection to a black buyer even though enforcing private restrictive covenants was generally valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey (1967) struck down a California constitutional amendment that prohibited enacting any law that restricted an individual from refusing to sell land to a buyer for any reason. The Court’s argument seemed to be that the amendment to the state constitution was a state action violating equal protection.

  • syLix says:

    Now that the Supreme Court requires some kind of state action in order to enforce Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is important to look at the cases it has decided to determine which cases constitute state action when private actors are involved. These cases usually involve private actors who perform public functions or exercise powers that are usually reserved solely for the state or when government and a private entity become intertwined to the point that the entity acts as the government. The Supreme Court has decided a number of cases ruling it was unconstitutional for private political parties to exclude blacks from primary elections for political candidates at the state’s general elections—Nixon v. Condon (1932), Smith v. Allwright (1944), and Terry v. Adams (1953). The Court has also ruled in Marsh v. Alabama (1946) and Evans v. Newton (1966) that the private actions of trustees of a company town or public park constitute state action.

  • pehib says:

    State Action

    The State Action Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that a state cannot make any law that abridges the privileges or immunities of any citizen. Some of the questions that have been raised regarding state action are whether state action is only aimed at states and those acting under state authority as well as whether Congress’s power under the Enforcement Clause for the prohibitions against state action is limited to enacting laws against states. In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 185, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations, was unconstitutional because it tried to regulate private actors. The Court decided in United States v. Guest (1966) that the Enforcement Clause gave Congress the power to regulate the private of individuals who conspired with state officials to deprive people of their rights under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. In later cases, the Courts tried to distance itself from the Guest decision, and in United States v. Morrison (2000), the Supreme Court rejected the Guest dictum and struck down part of the Violence Against Women Act that provided a federal that provided a civil remedy for victims of sex-related violence.

  • ephowl says:

    It was not entirely obvious what Congress meant by those who are not subject to foreign powers though. Beginning in 1870, Congress offered citizenship to a number of different Indian tribes, so members belonging to those tribes could become citizens if they desired. In Elk v. Wilson (1884), the Supreme Court held that children born to members of Indian tribes governed by local tribal governments were not United States citizens. Congress granted citizenship to Indians in 1924 when it passed the Indian Citizenship Act. The Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) ruled that a child who was born in America to a non-United States citizen was a United States citizen.

  • uihib says:

    Secondary Sources
    3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment § 774.
    5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 104,
    Parole, § 104.06 (Matthew Bender).
    CALCRIM No. 219 POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY
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  • eaartef says:

    Related Instructions
    CALCRIM No. 220, Reasonable Doubt.
    CALCRIM No. 3453, Extension of Commitment.
    CALCRIM No. 3454, Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator.
    CALCRIM No. 3454A, Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually
    Violent Predator Act.
    CALCRIM No. 3456, Initial Commitment of Mentally Disordered Offender As
    Condition of Parole.
    CALCRIM No. 3457, Extension of Commitment as Mentally Disordered Offender.
    CALCRIM No. 3458, Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities.

  • brLix says:

    AUTHORITY
    • Instructional Requirements People v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393,
    1401 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 384]; Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(7); Welf. & Inst. Code,
    § 1801.5.

  • xphowl says:

    219. Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings
    The fact that a petition to (declare respondent a sexually violent
    predator/declare respondent a mentally disordered offender/extend
    respondent’s commitment) has been filed is not evidence that the
    petition is true. You must not be biased against the respondent just
    because the petition has been filed and this matter has been brought to
    trial. The Petitioner is required to prove the allegations of the petition
    are true beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an
    abiding conviction that the allegations of the petition are true. The
    evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life
    is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
    In deciding whether the Petitioner has proved the allegations of the
    petition are true beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially
    compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the
    entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the Respondent
    beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the petition is not
    true.
    New August 2009; Revised August 2015

  • ephib says:

    219. Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings
    The fact that a petition to (declare respondent a sexually violent
    predator/declare respondent a mentally disordered offender/extend
    respondent’s commitment) has been filed is not evidence that the
    petition is true. You must not be biased against the respondent just
    because the petition has been filed and this matter has been brought to
    trial. The Petitioner is required to prove the allegations of the petition
    are true beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an
    abiding conviction that the allegations of the petition are true. The
    evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life
    is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
    In deciding whether the Petitioner has proved the allegations of the
    petition are true beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially
    compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the
    entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the Respondent
    beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the petition is not
    true.
    New August 2009; Revised August 2015

  • ciartef says:

    POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY CALCRIM No. 208
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    B. GENERAL LEGAL CONCEPTS

  • qqLix says:

    AUTHORITY
    • Identification as John or Jane Doe. Pen. Code, § 293.5(a).
    • Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); People v. Ramirez (1997)
    55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].
    • Statute Constitutional. People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 54–59 [64
    Cal.Rptr.2d 9].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 553.
    3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 70,
    Discovery and Investigation, § 70.05 (Matthew Bender).
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    6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142,
    Crimes Against the Person, § 142.24[3] (Matthew Bender).
    209–218. Reserved for Future Use

  • nyhib says:

    Penal Code section 293.5 provides that the alleged victim of certain offenses may
    be identified as John or Jane Doe if the court finds it is “reasonably necessary to
    protect the privacy of the person and will not unduly prejudice the prosecution or
    the defense.” (Id., § 293.5(a).) This applies only to alleged victims of offenses
    under the following Penal Code sections: 261 (rape), 261.5 (unlawful sexual
    intercourse), 262 (rape of spouse), 264.1 (aiding and abetting rape), 286 (sodomy),
    288 (lewd or lascivious act), 288a (oral copulation), and 289 (penetration by force).
    Note that the full name must still be provided in discovery. (Id., § 293.5(a); Reid v.
    Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1338 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 714].)
    Give the last two bracketed sentences on request. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 55
    Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)

  • gphowl says:

    208. Witness Identified as John or Jane Doe
    In this case, a person is called ((John/Jane) Doe/ ). This name is used only to protect (his/her) privacy,
    as required by law. [The fact that the person is identified in this way is
    not evidence. Do not consider this fact for any purpose.]
    New August 2009
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    If an alleged victim will be identified as John or Jane Doe, the court has a sua
    sponte duty to give this instruction at the beginning and at the end of the trial.
    (Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64
    Cal.Rptr.2d 9].)

  • wiartef says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. This instruction should
    not be given: (1) when the evidence demonstrates that the offense was committed
    at a specific time and place and the defendant has presented a defense of alibi or
    lack of opportunity; or (2) when two similar offenses are charged in separate
    counts. (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 358–359 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807
    P.2d 1009]; People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 557 [108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d
    705], overruled on other grounds in Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49
    Cal.3d 713 [263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547]; People v. Barney (1983) 143
    Cal.App.3d 490, 497–498 [192 Cal.Rptr. 172]; People v. Gavin (1971) 21
    Cal.App.3d 408, 415–416 [98 Cal.Rptr. 518]; People v. Deletto (1983) 147
    Cal.App.3d 458, 474–475 [195 Cal.Rptr. 233].)
    AUTHORITY
    • Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 955; People v. Jennings (1991) 53
    Cal.3d 334, 358–359 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009]; People v. Jones
    (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 557 [108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705]; People v. Barney
    (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 490, 497–498 [192 Cal.Rptr. 172]; People v. Gavin
    (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 408, 415–416 [98 Cal.Rptr. 518]; People v. Deletto
    (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 458, 474–475 [195 Cal.Rptr. 233].
    • This Instruction Correctly States the Law. People v. Rojas (2015) 237
    Cal.App.4th 1298, 1304 [188 Cal.Rptr.3d 811].
    Secondary Sources
    2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 40,
    Accusatory Pleadings, § 40.07[2] (Matthew Bender).
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  • fahib says:

    207. Proof Need Not Show Actual Date
    It is alleged that the crime occurred on [or about] . The People are not required to prove that the crime took
    place exactly on that day but only that it happened reasonably close to
    that day.
    New January 2006; Revised February 2014, February 2016

  • dyartef says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court may give this instruction if one or more of the original defendants has
    been removed from the case, whether through plea, dismissal, or flight.
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  • acLix says:

    206. One or More Defendants Removed From Case
    The charge[s] against defendant[s] no longer need[s] to be decided in this case.
    Do not speculate about or consider in any way why the charge[s]
    against defendant[s]
    (do/
    does) not need to be decided.
    New January 2006

  • rphowl says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court may give this instruction if one or more of the original counts has been
    removed from the case, whether through plea or dismissal.
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  • nthib says:

    205. Charge Removed From Jury Consideration
    Count[s] charging the defendant with no longer need[s] to be decided in this case.
    Do not speculate about or consider in any way why you no longer need
    to decide (this/these) count[s].
    New January 2006

  • omLix says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if a defendant has been
    restrained in a manner that is visible to the jury. (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d
    282, 291–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322].) If the restraints are not visible,
    do not give this instruction unless requested by the defense.
    The court must find a “manifest need for such restraints” and the record must
    clearly disclose the reasons the restraints were used. (People v. Duran, supra, 16
    Cal.3d at pp. 290–291.) “The imposition of physical restraints in the absence of a
    record showing . . . violence or a threat of violence or other nonconforming
    conduct will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 291.) The
    court must make the determination based on facts, not rumor, and may not delegate
    the decision to law enforcement personnel. (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201,
    1218 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].) The reasons supporting physical restraints
    must relate to the individual defendant. The court cannot rely on the nature of the
    charges, the courtroom design, or the lack of sufficient staff. (People v. Slaughter
    (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1213 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262]; People v.
    Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 986–987 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519];
    People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 652 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175].)
    The use of stun belts is subject to the same requirements. (People v. Mar, supra, 28
    Cal.4th at pp. 1205–1206.) In addition, the Supreme Court has urged “great
    caution” in using stun belts at all, stating that, prior to using such devices, courts
    must consider the psychological impact, risk of accidental activation, physical
    dangers, and limited ability to control the level of shock delivered. (Ibid.)
    AUTHORITY
    • Instructional Duty. People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292 [127
    Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322].
    • Requirements Before Use. People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–292
    [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201,
    1218 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].
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    • Use of Stun Belts. People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1205–1206 [124
    Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial,
    §§ 11–16.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 80,
    Defendant’s Trial Rights, § 80.09[6][b], [c], [d] (Matthew Bender).

  • hphowl says:

    204. Defendant Physically Restrained
    The fact that physical restraints have been placed on [the] defendant[s]
    [ ] is not evidence. Do not speculate about
    the reason. You must completely disregard this circumstance in deciding
    the issues in this case. Do not consider it for any purpose or discuss it
    during your deliberations.
    New January 2006

  • avhib says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if multiple defendants are
    on trial. (People v. Mask (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [233 Cal.Rptr. 181];
    People v. Fulton (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879].)
    Give alternative A if any of the charges against the defendants are different. Give
    alternative B if all of the charges against all defendants are the same.
    AUTHORITY
    • Separate Verdicts When Multiple Defendants. Pen. Code, §§ 970, 1160.
    • Instructional Duty. People v. Mask (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [233
    Cal.Rptr. 181]; People v. Fulton (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr.
    879].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 644.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85,
    Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.02[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).
    32
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  • rphowl says:

    203. Multiple Defendants

    [Because more than one defendant is on trial here, I am going to
    remind you which individuals are charged with which crimes.
    is charged with .
    is charged with .]

    [(Both/All) defendants in this case are charged with the same crimes.]
    You must separately consider the evidence as it applies to each
    defendant. You must decide each charge for each defendant separately.
    If you cannot reach a verdict on (all/both) of the defendants, or on any
    of the charges against any defendant, you must report your
    disagreement to the court and you must return your verdict on any
    defendant or charge on which you have unanimously agreed.
    Unless I tell you otherwise, all instructions apply to each defendant.
    New January 2006

  • jhartef says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the members of the jury that they may
    take notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
    The court may specify its preferred disposition of the notes after trial. No statute or
    rule of court requires any particular disposition.
    AUTHORITY
    • Jurors’ Use of Notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
    Secondary Sources
    6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Judgment,
    § 18.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83,
    Evidence, § 83.05[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.05[2], [3], Ch.
    87, Death Penalty, §§ 87.20, 87.24 (Matthew Bender).
    31
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  • tnLix says:

    202. Note-Taking and Reading Back of Testimony
    [You have been given notebooks and may have taken notes during the
    trial. You may use your notes during deliberations.] Your notes are for
    your own individual use to help you remember what happened during
    the trial. Please keep in mind that your notes may be inaccurate or
    incomplete. If there is a disagreement about the testimony [and
    stipulations] at trial, you may ask that the court reporter’s record be
    read to you. It is the record that must guide your deliberations, not
    your notes. You must accept the court reporter’s record as accurate.
    Please do not remove your notes from the jury room.
    At the end of the trial, your notes will be (collected and
    destroyed/collected and retained by the court but not as a part of the
    case record/ ).
    New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, August 2009, February 2012

  • zyhib says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jurors on how they must conduct
    themselves during trial. (Pen. Code, § 1122.)
    AUTHORITY
    • No Independent Research. Pen. Code, § 1122; People v. Karis (1988) 46
    Cal.3d 612, 642 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; People v. Castro (1986)
    184 Cal.App.3d 849, 853 [229 Cal.Rptr. 280]; People v. Sutter (1982) 134
    Cal.App.3d 806, 820 [184 Cal.Rptr. 829].
    Secondary Sources
    6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Judgment,
    § 21.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, Jury
    Selection and Opening Statement, § 81.06[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and
    Verdict, § 85.05[4][a][i] (Matthew Bender).
    30
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  • mphowl says:

    201. Do Not Investigate
    Do not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or ]) in any way
    in connection with this case, either on your own or as a group. Do not
    investigate the facts or the law or do any research regarding this case,
    either on your own, or as a group. Do not conduct any tests or
    experiments, or visit the scene of any event involved in this case. If you
    happen to pass by the scene, do not stop or investigate.
    New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2012

  • nzartef says:

    RELATED ISSUES
    Jury Misconduct
    It is error to instruct the jury to immediately advise the court if a juror refuses to
    deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based
    on penalty, punishment, or any other improper basis. (People v. Engelman (2002)
    28 Cal.4th 436, 449 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209].)
    POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY CALCRIM No. 200
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  • tchib says:

    AUTHORITY
    • Copies of Instructions. Pen. Code, §§ 1093(f), 1137.
    • Judge Determines Law. Pen. Code, §§ 1124, 1126; People v. Como (2002) 95
    Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 922]; see People v. Williams (2001)
    25 Cal.4th 441, 455 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209].
    • Jury to Decide the Facts. Pen. Code, § 1127.
    • Attorney’s Comments Are Not Evidence. People v. Stuart (1959) 168
    Cal.App.2d 57, 60–61 [335 P.2d 189].
    • Consider All Instructions Together. People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622,
    679 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640]; People v. Rivers (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th
    1040, 1046 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; People v. Shaw (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 606,
    623 [47 Cal.Rptr. 96].
    • Follow Applicable Instructions. People v. Palmer (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 679,
    686–687 [173 P.2d 680].
    • No Bias, Sympathy, or Prejudice. Pen. Code, § 1127h; People v. Hawthorne
    (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 73 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].
    CALCRIM No. 200 POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY
    28
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    • This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174 [67
    Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, §§ 643,
    644.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 80,
    Defendant’s Trial Rights, § 80.05[1], Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.02, Ch. 85, Submission
    to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[1], [2][c], 85.03[1], 85.05[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).

  • yehib says:

    http://www.lexisnexis.com/bookstore, for public and internal court use
    A.
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    do apply to the facts as you find them.
    New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, December 2008
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that the jurors are the exclusive judges
    of the facts and that they are entitled to a copy of the written instructions when
    they deliberate. (Pen. Code, §§ 1093(f), 1137.) Although there is no sua sponte duty
    to instruct on the other topics described in this instruction, there is authority
    approving instruction on these topics.
    In the first paragraph, select the appropriate bracketed alternative on written
    instructions. Penal Code section 1093(f) requires the court to give the jury a written
    copy of the instructions on request. The committee believes that the better practice
    is to always provide the jury with written instructions. If the court, in the absence
    of a jury request, elects not to provide jurors with written instructions, the court
    must modify the first paragraph to inform the jurors that they may request a written
    copy of the instructions.
    Do not instruct a jury in the penalty phase of a capital case that they cannot
    consider sympathy. (People v. Easley (1982) 34 Cal.3d 858, 875–880 [196 Cal.Rptr.
    309, 671 P.2d 813].) Instead of this instruction, CALCRIM 761 is the proper
    introductory instruction for the penalty phase of a capital case.
    Do not give the bracketed sentence in the final paragraph if the court will be
    commenting on the evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1127.

  • vuartef says:

    INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS AND
    ADMONITIONS
    200. Duties of Judge and Jury
    Members of the jury, I will now instruct you on the law that applies to
    this case. [I will give you a copy of the instructions to use in the jury
    room.] [Each of you has a copy of these instructions to use in the jury
    room.] [The instructions that you receive may be printed, typed, or
    written by hand. Certain sections may have been crossed-out or added.
    Disregard any deleted sections and do not try to guess what they might
    have been. Only consider the final version of the instructions in your
    deliberations.]
    You must decide what the facts are. It is up to all of you, and you alone,
    to decide what happened, based only on the evidence that has been
    presented to you in this trial.
    Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your
    decision. Bias includes, but is not limited to, bias for or against the
    witnesses, attorneys, defendant[s] or alleged victim[s], based on
    disability, gender, nationality, national origin, race or ethnicity, religion,
    gender identity, sexual orientation, age, [or] socioeconomic status (./,) [or
    .]
    You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you disagree with
    it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with
    my instructions, you must follow my instructions.
    Pay careful attention to all of these instructions and consider them
    together. If I repeat any instruction or idea, do not conclude that it is
    more important than any other instruction or idea just because I
    repeated it.
    Some words or phrases used during this trial have legal meanings that
    are different from their meanings in everyday use. These words and
    phrases will be specifically defined in these instructions. Please be sure
    to listen carefully and follow the definitions that I give you. Words and
    phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied
    using their ordinary, everyday meanings.
    Some of these instructions may not apply, depending on your findings
    about the facts of the case. [Do not assume just because I give a
    particular instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts.]
    After you have decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that
    27

  • vpLix says:

    POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY
    A. INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS AND ADMONITIONS
    200. Duties of Judge and Jury
    201. Do Not Investigate
    202. Note-Taking and Reading Back of Testimony
    203. Multiple Defendants
    204. Defendant Physically Restrained
    205. Charge Removed From Jury Consideration
    206. One or More Defendants Removed From Case
    207. Proof Need Not Show Actual Date
    208. Witness Identified as John or Jane Doe
    209–218. Reserved for Future Use
    B. GENERAL LEGAL CONCEPTS
    219. Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings
    220. Reasonable Doubt
    221. Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial
    222. Evidence
    223. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined
    224. Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence
    225. Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State
    226. Witnesses
    227–239. Reserved for Future Use
    C. CAUSATION
    240. Causation
    241–249. Reserved for Future Use
    D. UNION OF ACT AND INTENT
    250. Union of Act and Intent: General Intent
    251. Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State
    252. Union of Act and Intent: General and Specific Intent Together
    253. Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence
    254. Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime
    255–299. Reserved for Future Use

  • iphowl says:

    Citizenship

    Also known as the Naturalization Clause, the Citizenship Clause is Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. The clause conferred U.S. and state citizenship at birth to all individuals born in the United States who are not subject to foreign powers. Before the Fourteenth Amendment was added, citizens of states were automatically considered citizens of the United States. The 1857 case Dredd v. Scott held that African Americans were not U.S. citizens, even if they were free. The amendment guaranteed that everyone born or naturalized in the United States and under its jurisdiction would be a United States citizen. It also ensured that federal citizenship was also made primary, which meant that states could not prevent freed slaves from obtaining state citizenship and thus federal citizenship.

  • dsLix says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to admonish the jury “at each adjournment of the
    court before the submission of the cause to the jury.” Pen. Code, § 1122(b).
    Adjournment means continuing proceedings to another court day, not every time
    the court calls a recess. People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 174 [246
    Cal.Rptr. 673, 691, 753 P.2d 629], citing People v. Moore (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d
    851, 852–853 [93 Cal.Rptr. 447].
    AUTHORITY
    • Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 1122(b).
    Secondary Sources
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, Jury
    Selection and Opening Statement, § 81.06[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and
    Verdict, § 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).
    125–199. Reserved for Future Use
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  • izartef says:

    124. Separation Admonition
    [You may be permitted to separate during recesses and at the end of the
    day. I will tell you when to return. Please remember, we cannot begin
    the trial until all of you are in place, so it is important to be on time.]
    Remember, do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any
    subject involved in it with anyone, including the other jurors. Do not do
    research, share information, or talk to each other or to anyone else
    about the facts of the case or anything else connected with the trial, and
    do not use any form of electronic or wireless communication to do any
    of those things, either.
    Do not make up your mind or express any opinion about the case or
    any issue connected with the trial until after you have discussed the case
    with the other jurors during deliberations.
    New January 2006; Revised August 2012

  • bphowl says:

    AUTHORITY
    • Identification as John or Jane Doe. Pen. Code, § 293.5(a).
    • Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); People v. Ramirez (1997)
    55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].
    • Statute Constitutional. People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 54–59
    [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 553.
    3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 70,
    Discovery and Investigation, § 70.05 (Matthew Bender).
    6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142,
    Crimes Against the Person, § 142.24[3] (Matthew Bender).
    23
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  • nphib says:

    If an alleged victim will be identified as John or Jane Doe, the court has a sua
    sponte duty to give this instruction at the beginning and at the end of the trial.
    (Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64
    Cal.Rptr.2d 9].)
    Penal Code section 293.5 provides that the alleged victim of certain offenses may
    be identified as John or Jane Doe if the court finds it is “reasonably necessary to
    protect the privacy of the person and will not unduly prejudice the prosecution or
    the defense.” (Id., § 293.5(a).) This applies only to alleged victims of offenses
    under the following Penal Code sections: 261 (rape), 261.5 (unlawful sexual
    intercourse), 262 (rape of spouse), 264.1 (aiding and abetting rape), 286 (sodomy),
    288 (lewd or lascivious act), 288a (oral copulation), and 289 (penetration by force).
    Note that the full name must still be provided in discovery. (Id., § 293.5(a); People
    v. Bohannon (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 798, 803, fn. 7 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 488]; Reid v.
    Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1338 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 714].)
    Give the last two bracketed sentences on request. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 55
    Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)

  • tbLix says:

    123. Witness Identified as John or Jane Doe
    In this case, a person is called ((John/Jane) Doe/ ). This name is used only to protect (his/her) privacy,
    as required by law. [The fact that the person is identified in this way is
    not evidence. Do not consider this fact for any purpose.]
    New January 2006
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty

  • udartef says:

    122. Corporation Is a Person
    (A/The) defendant[s] in this case, , (is a corporation/are corporations). Under the
    law, a corporation must be treated in the same way as a natural person.
    When I use words like person or he or she in these instructions to refer
    to the defendant[s], those instructions [also] apply to
    .
    New January 2006
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if the defendant is a
    corporation.
    AUTHORITY
    • Corporation Is a Person. Pen. Code, § 7.
    Secondary Sources
    1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, §§ 3–6.
    2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 42,
    Arraignment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining, § 42.21[2][e] (Matthew Bender).
    22
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  • vxhib says:

    AUTHORITY
    • Juror May Not Retranslate. People v. Cabrera (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 300,
    303–304 [281 Cal.Rptr. 238].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin, California Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Presentation, § 43.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85,
    Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.05[4][a][i] (Matthew Bender).
    PRETRIAL CALCRIM No. 121
    21
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  • yphowl says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The committee recommends giving Alternative A of this instruction whenever
    testimony will be received with the assistance of an interpreter, though no case has
    held that the court has a sua sponte duty to give the instruction. The instruction
    may be given at the beginning of the case, when the person requiring translation
    testifies, or both, at the court’s discretion. If the jury may hear a recording that is at
    least partially in a foreign language, the court may give Alternative B with the
    appropriate bracketed language, as needed.
    If the court chooses, the instruction may also be modified and given again at the
    end of the case, with all other instructions.
    It is misconduct for a juror to retranslate for other jurors testimony that has been
    translated by the court-appointed interpreter. (People v. Cabrera (1991) 230
    Cal.App.3d 300, 303 [281 Cal.Rptr. 238].) “If [the juror] believed the court
    interpreter was translating incorrectly, the proper action would have been to call the
    matter to the trial court’s attention, not take it upon herself to provide her fellow
    jurors with the ‘correct’ translation.” (Id. at p. 304.)
    20
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  • ozhib says:

    121. Duty to Abide by Translation Provided in Court

    Some testimony may be given in . An interpreter will provide a
    translation for you at the time that the testimony is given. You must rely
    on the translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand
    the language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any testimony
    for other jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated
    testimony incorrectly, let me know immediately by writing a note and
    giving it to the (clerk/bailiff).

    You (may/are about to) hear a recording [that is partially] in a foreign
    language. You will receive a transcript with an English language
    translation of that recording.
    You must rely on the transcript, even if you understand the language in
    the recording. Do not share your own translation with other jurors.
    Please write a note to the clerk or bailiff if you believe the translation is
    wrong. [If the recording is partially in English, the English parts of the
    recording are the evidence.]
    New January 2006; Revised February 2014

  • ewartef says:

    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if a juror will be using the
    assistance of a service provider. (Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).)
    AUTHORITY
    • Juror Not Incompetent Due to Disability. Code Civ. Proc., § 203(a)(6).
    • Juror May Use Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224.
    • Court Must Instruct on Use of Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).
    Secondary Sources
    7 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Trial, §§ 320, 330.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, Jury
    Selection and Opening Statement, §§ 81.02[2], 81.04[4][a] (Matthew Bender).
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  • FvgTow says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    This instruction may be given on request.
    AUTHORITY
    • Basis for Right of Self-Representation. Sixth Amendment, Constitution of the
    United States; Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45
    L.Ed.2d 562].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 248.
    1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 1, The
    California Defense Advocate, § 1.73 (Matthew Bender).
    108–119. Reserved for Future Use
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    B. ADMONITIONS
    120. Service Provider for Juror With Disability: Beginning of Trial
    During trial, will be
    assisted by (a/an)
    . The is not a member of the jury and is not to participate in the
    deliberations in any way other than as necessary to provide the service
    to
    .
    New January 2006
    BENCH NOTES

  • uwLix says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    This instruction may be given on request.
    AUTHORITY
    • Statutory Admonitions. See generally Pen. Code, § 1122.
    • Juror Questions. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1033.
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 643.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82,
    Witnesses, § 82.02[2] (Matthew Bender).
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    107. Pro Per Defendant
    (The defendant[s]/ ) (has/have) the right to be represented by an attorney in
    this trial, as do all criminal defendants in this country. (He/She/They)
    (has/have) decided instead to exercise (his/her/their) constitutional right
    to act as (his/her/their) own attorney in this case. Do not allow that
    decision to affect your verdict.
    The court applies the rules of evidence and procedure to a (selfrepresented
    defendant/
    ).
    New August 2009

  • DwqTow says:

    PRETRIAL CALCRIM No. 105
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    • Witness Who Lies. People v. Murillo (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55
    Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; People v. Reyes (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 957, 965 [240 Cal.Rptr.
    752]; People v. Johnson (1986) 190 Cal.App.3d 187, 192–194 [237 Cal.Rptr.
    479].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 642.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85,
    Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][b], [c], 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).
    CALCRIM No. 105 PRETRIAL
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    106. Jurors Asking Questions
    If, during the trial, you have a question that you believe should be
    asked of a witness, you may write out the question and send it to me
    through the bailiff. I will discuss the question with the attorneys and
    decide whether it may be asked. Do not feel slighted or disappointed if
    your question is not asked. Your question may not be asked for a
    variety of reasons, including the reason that the question may call for
    an answer that is inadmissible for legal reasons. Also, do not guess the
    reason your question was not asked or speculate about what the answer
    might have been. Always remember that you are not advocates for one
    side or the other in this case. You are impartial judges of the facts.
    New January 2006; Revised August 2006

  • rzLix says:

    conflicts. Consider whether the differences are important or not. People
    sometimes honestly forget things or make mistakes about what they
    remember. Also, two people may witness the same event yet see or hear
    it differently.
    [If the evidence establishes that a witness’s character for truthfulness
    has not been discussed among the people who know him or her, you
    may conclude from the lack of discussion that the witness’s character
    for truthfulness is good.]
    [If you do not believe a witness’s testimony that he or she no longer
    remembers something, that testimony is inconsistent with the witness’s
    earlier statement on that subject.]
    [If you decide that a witness deliberately lied about something
    significant in this case, you should consider not believing anything that
    witness says. Or, if you think the witness lied about some things, but
    told the truth about others, you may simply accept the part that you
    think is true and ignore the rest.]
    New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on factors relevant to a witness’s
    credibility. (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr.
    119, 538 P.2d 247].) Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on
    inconsistencies in testimony or a witness who lies, there is authority approving
    instruction on both topics. (Dodds v. Stellar (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175
    P.2d 607]; People v. Murillo (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d
    21].)
    The court may strike any of the enumerated impermissible bases for bias that are
    clearly inapplicable in a given case.
    Give all of the bracketed factors that are relevant based on the evidence. (Evid.
    Code, § 780(e), (i), and (k).)
    Give any of the final three bracketed paragraphs if relevant based on the evidence.
    AUTHORITY
    • Factors. Evid. Code, § 780; People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864,
    883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].
    • Proof of Character by Negative Evidence. People v. Adams (1902) 137 Cal.
    580, 582 [70 P. 662].
    • Inconsistencies. Dodds v. Stellar (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175 P.2d
    607].

  • ijTew says:

    105. Witnesses
    You alone must judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses. In
    deciding whether testimony is true and accurate, use your common
    sense and experience. You must judge the testimony of each witness by
    the same standards, setting aside any bias or prejudice you may have.
    You may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony. Consider
    the testimony of each witness and decide how much of it you believe.
    In evaluating a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that
    reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that
    testimony. Among the factors that you may consider are:
    • How well could the witness see, hear, or otherwise perceive the
    things about which the witness testified?
    • How well was the witness able to remember and describe what
    happened?
    • What was the witness’s behavior while testifying?
    • Did the witness understand the questions and answer them
    directly?
    • Was the witness’s testimony influenced by a factor such as bias
    or prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in
    the case, or a personal interest in how the case is decided?
    • What was the witness’s attitude about the case or about
    testifying?
    • Did the witness make a statement in the past that is consistent or
    inconsistent with his or her testimony?
    • How reasonable is the testimony when you consider all the other
    evidence in the case?
    • [Did other evidence prove or disprove any fact about which the
    witness testified?]
    • [Did the witness admit to being untruthful?]
    • [What is the witness’s character for truthfulness?]
    • [Has the witness been convicted of a felony?]
    • [Has the witness engaged in [other] conduct that reflects on his
    or her believability?]
    • [Was the witness promised immunity or leniency in exchange for
    his or her testimony?]
    Do not automatically reject testimony just because of inconsistencies or
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  • JzfTow says:

    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on these evidentiary topics; however,
    instruction on these principles has been approved. (See People v. Barajas (1983)
    145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809 [193 Cal.Rptr. 750]; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15
    Cal.4th 795, 843–844 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2]; People v. Horton (1995) 11
    Cal.4th 1068, 1121 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].)
    AUTHORITY
    • Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 140.
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    • Arguments Not Evidence. People v. Barajas (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809
    [193 Cal.Rptr. 750].
    • Questions Not Evidence. People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 843–844
    [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2].
    • Striking Testimony. People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121 [47
    Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].
    • This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183
    [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 636.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83,
    Evidence, §§ 83.01[1], 83.02[2] (Matthew Bender).
    PRETRIAL CALCRIM No. 104
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  • viLix says:

    PRETRIAL CALCRIM No. 103
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    104. Evidence
    You must decide what the facts are in this case. You must use only the
    evidence that is presented in the courtroom [or during a jury view].
    “Evidence” is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted
    into evidence, and anything else I tell you to consider as evidence. The
    fact that the defendant was arrested, charged with a crime, or brought
    to trial is not evidence of guilt.
    Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements
    and closing arguments, the attorneys will discuss the case, but their
    remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the
    witnesses’ answers are evidence. The attorneys’ questions are significant
    only if they help you understand the witnesses’ answers. Do not assume
    that something is true just because one of the attorneys asks a question
    that suggests it is true.
    During the trial, the attorneys may object to questions asked of a
    witness. I will rule on the objections according to the law. If I sustain an
    objection, the witness will not be permitted to answer, and you must
    ignore the question. If the witness does not answer, do not guess what
    the answer might have been or why I ruled as I did. If I order
    testimony stricken from the record, you must disregard it and must not
    consider that testimony for any purpose.
    You must disregard anything you see or hear when the court is not in
    session, even if it is done or said by one of the parties or witnesses.
    The court reporter is making a record of everything said during the
    trial. If you decide that it is necessary, you may ask that the court
    reporter’s record be read to you. You must accept the court reporter’s
    record as accurate.
    New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2009

  • zoLix says:

    103. Reasonable Doubt
    I will now explain the presumption of innocence and the People’s
    burden of proof. The defendant[s] (has/have) pleaded not guilty to the
    charge[s]. The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the
    defendant[s] is not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be
    biased against the defendant[s] just because (he/she/they) (has/have)
    been arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial.
    A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This
    presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something,
    I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I
    specifically tell you otherwise].
    Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an
    abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not
    eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some
    possible or imaginary doubt.
    In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a
    reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the
    evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the
    evidence proves the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (he/
    she/they) (is/are) entitled to an acquittal and you must find (him/her/
    them) not guilty.
    New January 2006; Revised June 2007
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the presumption of innocence and
    the state’s burden of proof before deliberations. (People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d
    220, 225–227 [115 Cal.Rptr. 352, 524 P.2d 824]; People v. Soldavini (1941) 45
    Cal.App.2d 460, 463 [114 P.2d 415]; People v. Phillips (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952,
    956–958 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 532].) This instruction is included in this section for the
    convenience of judges who wish to instruct on this point during voir dire or before
    testimony begins.
    If the court will be instructing that the prosecution must prove something by a
    preponderance of the evidence, give the bracketed phrase “unless I specifically tell
    you otherwise.”
    AUTHORITY
    • Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 1096, 1096a; People v. Freeman
    (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; Victor v.
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    Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583];
    Lisenbee v. Henry (9th Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 997.
    • Previous Version of CALCRIM 103 Upheld. People v. Reyes (2007) 151
    Cal.App.4th 1491, 1496 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 777].
    • Reference to Elements Not Required. People v. Ramos (2008) 163
    Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088–1089 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 186].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, §§ 521,
    637, 640.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83,
    Evidence, § 83.03[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][a][i],
    85.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
    COMMENTARY
    This instruction is based directly on Penal Code section 1096. The primary changes
    are a reordering of concepts and a definition of reasonable doubt stated in the
    affirmative rather than in the negative. The instruction also refers to the jury’s duty
    to impartially compare and consider all the evidence. (See Victor v. Nebraska
    (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583].) The appellate courts
    have urged the trial courts to exercise caution in modifying the language of section
    1096 to avoid error in defining reasonable doubt. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8
    Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; People v. Garcia (1975)
    54 Cal.App.3d 61 [126 Cal.Rptr. 275].) The instruction includes all the concepts
    contained in section 1096 and substantially tracks the statutory language.

  • yeLix says:

    Fourteenth Amendment
    The Fourteenth Amendment contains a number of important concepts, most famously state action, privileges & immunities, citizenship, due process, and equal protection—all of which are contained in Section One. However, the Fourteenth Amendment contains four other sections. Section two deals with the apportionment of representatives to Congress. Section Three forbids anyone who participates in “insurrection or rebellion” against the United States from holding federal office. Section Four addresses federal debt and repudiates debts accrued by the Confederacy. Section Five expressly authorizes Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation.” The states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 in the immediate aftermath of the American Civil War, along with the other Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth and Fifteenth.

  • oiLix says:

    CALCRIM No. 101 PRETRIAL
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    102. Note-Taking
    You have been given notebooks and may take notes during the trial. Do
    not remove them from the courtroom. You may take your notes into the
    jury room during deliberations. I do not mean to discourage you from
    taking notes, but here are some points to consider if you take notes:
    1. Note-taking may tend to distract you. It may affect your ability
    to listen carefully to all the testimony and to watch the witnesses
    as they testify;
    AND
    2. The notes are for your own individual use to help you remember
    what happened during the trial. Please keep in mind that your
    notes may be inaccurate or incomplete.
    At the end of the trial, your notes will be (collected and
    destroyed/collected and retained by the court but not as a part of the
    case record/ ).
    New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the members of the jury that they may
    take notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
    The court may specify its preferred disposition of the notes after trial. No statute or
    rule of court requires any particular disposition.
    AUTHORITY
    • Resolving Jurors’ Questions. Pen. Code, § 1137.
    • Jurors’ Use of Notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031
    • This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183
    [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 643.
    6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Judgment,
    § 18.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85,
    Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.05[2] (Matthew Bender).
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  • uwodgegxibefu says:

    PRETRIAL CALCRIM No. 101
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    about the case, except a fellow juror during deliberations, and that this
    includes, but is not limited to, spouses, spiritual leaders or advisers, or
    therapists. Moreover, the jury should also be instructed that if anyone, other
    than a fellow juror during deliberations, tells a juror his or her view of the
    evidence in the case, the juror should report that conversation immediately to
    the court.
    (Id. at p. 306, fn. 11.)
    The court may, at its discretion, add the suggested language to the second
    paragraph of this instruction.
    Jury Misconduct
    It is error to instruct the jury to immediately advise the court if a juror refuses to
    deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based
    on penalty, punishment, or any other improper basis. (People v. Engelman (2002)
    28 Cal.4th 436, 449 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209].)

  • obanola says:

    Admonition Not to Discuss Case With Anyone
    In People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 298–300 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d
    1249], a capital case, two jurors violated the court’s admonition not to discuss the
    case with anyone by consulting with their pastors regarding the death penalty. The
    Supreme Court stated:
    It is troubling that during deliberations not one but two jurors had
    conversations with their pastors that ultimately addressed the issue being
    resolved at the penalty phase in this case. Because jurors instructed not to
    speak to anyone about the case except a fellow juror during deliberations . . . .
    may assume such an instruction does not apply to confidential relationships, we
    recommend the jury be expressly instructed that they may not speak to anyone

  • iejiewiyi says:

    Rule 2.1035.
    When giving this instruction during the penalty phase of a capital case, the court
    has a sua sponte duty to delete the sentence which reads “Do not let bias,
    sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision.” (People v.
    Lanphear (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081];
    California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 545 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934].)
    The court should also delete the following sentence: “You must reach your verdict
    without any consideration of punishment.”
    CALCRIM No. 101 PRETRIAL
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    If there will be a jury view, give the bracketed phrase “unless I tell you otherwise”
    in the fourth paragraph. (Pen. Code, § 1119.)
    AUTHORITY
    • Statutory Admonitions. Pen. Code, § 1122.
    • Avoid Discussing the Case. People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199 [155
    Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91]; In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d
    74, 860 P.2d 466]; In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646–658 [38
    Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985].
    • Avoid News Reports. People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108–1111
    [269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327], disapproved on other grounds in People v.
    Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d. 394, 889 P.2d 588].
    • Judge’s Conduct as Indication of Verdict. People v. Hunt (1915) 26 Cal.App.
    514, 517 [147 P. 476].
    • No Bias, Sympathy, or Prejudice. People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43,
    73 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].
    • No Independent Research. People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 642 [250
    Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; People v. Castro (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 849,
    853 [229 Cal.Rptr. 280]; People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 820 [184
    Cal.Rptr. 829].
    • This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174,
    1182–1183 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
    • Court’s Contempt Power for Violations of Admonitions. Pen. Code,
    § 1122(a)(1); Code Civ. Proc. § 1209(a)(6) (effective 1/1/12).
    Secondary Sources
    5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000), Criminal Trial § 643.
    4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, Jury
    Selection and Opening Statement, § 81.06[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and
    Verdict, § 85.05[1], [4] (Matthew Bender).
    RELATED ISSUES

  • otoakusa says:

    discuss it. If that person keeps talking to you about the case, you must
    end the conversation.
    If you receive any information about this case from any source outside
    of the trial, even unintentionally, do not share that information with any
    other juror. If you do receive such information, or if anyone tries to
    influence you or any juror, you must immediately tell the bailiff.
    Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Do not make up your mind
    about the verdict or any issue until after you have discussed the case
    with the other jurors during deliberations. Do not take anything I say
    or do during the trial as an indication of what I think about the facts,
    the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.
    Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your
    decision.
    You must reach your verdict without any consideration of punishment.
    I want to emphasize that you may not use any form of research or
    communication, including electronic or wireless research or
    communication, to research, share, communicate, or allow someone else
    to communicate with you regarding any subject of the trial. [If you
    violate this rule, you may be subject to jail time, a fine, or other
    punishment.]
    When the trial has ended and you have been released as jurors, you
    may discuss the case with anyone. [But under California law, you must
    wait at least 90 days before negotiating or agreeing to accept any
    payment for information about the case.]
    New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, April 2010,
    October 2010, April 2011, February 2012, August 2012, August 2014
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jurors on how they must conduct
    themselves during trial. (Pen. Code, § 1122.) See also California Rules of Court

  • omaraxoduseru says:

    Rule 2.1035.
    The court may give the optional bracketed language if using this instruction before
    jury selection begins.
    AUTHORITY
    • This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174,
    1179–1181 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
    CALCRIM No. 100 PRETRIAL
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    101. Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before, During, or
    After Jury Is Selected)
    Our system of justice requires that trials be conducted in open court
    with the parties presenting evidence and the judge deciding the law that
    applies to the case. It is unfair to the parties if you receive additional
    information from any other source because that information may be
    unreliable or irrelevant and the parties will not have had the
    opportunity to examine and respond to it. Your verdict must be based
    only on the evidence presented during trial in this court and the law as
    I provide it to you.
    During the trial, do not talk about the case or about any of the people
    or any subject involved in the case with anyone, not even your family,
    friends, spiritual advisors, or therapists. Do not share information about
    the case in writing, by email, by telephone, on the Internet, or by any
    other means of communication. You must not talk about these things
    with other jurors either, until you begin deliberating.
    As jurors, you may discuss the case together only after all of the
    evidence has been presented, the attorneys have completed their
    arguments, and I have instructed you on the law. After I tell you to
    begin your deliberations, you may discuss the case only in the jury
    room, and only when all jurors are present.
    You must not allow anything that happens outside of the courtroom to
    affect your decision [unless I tell you otherwise]. During the trial, do not
    read, listen to, or watch any news report or commentary about the case
    from any source.
    Do not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or ]) in any way
    in connection with this case, either on your own or as a group. Do not
    investigate the facts or the law or do any research regarding this case.
    Do not conduct any tests or experiments, or visit the scene of any event
    involved in this case. If you happen to pass by the scene, do not stop or
    investigate.
    [If you have a cell phone or other electronic device, keep it turned off
    while you are in the courtroom and during jury deliberations. An
    electronic device includes any data storage device. If someone needs to
    contact you in an emergency, the court can receive messages that it will
    deliver to you without delay.]
    During the trial, do not speak to a defendant, witness, lawyer, or anyone
    associated with them. Do not listen to anyone who tries to talk to you
    about the case or about any of the people or subjects involved in it. If
    5
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  • iciohoxagefa says:

    A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
    100. Trial Process (Before or After Voir Dire)
    [Jury service is very important and I would like to welcome you and
    thank you for your service.] Before we begin, I am going to describe for
    you how the trial will be conducted, and explain what you and the
    lawyers and I will be doing. When I refer to “the People,” I mean the
    attorney[s] from the (district attorney’s office/city attorney’s office/office
    of the attorney general) who (is/are) trying this case on behalf of the
    People of the State of California. When I refer to defense counsel, I
    mean the attorney[s] who (is/are) representing the defendant[s],
    .
    [The first step in this trial is jury selection.
    During jury selection, the attorneys and I will ask you questions. These
    questions are not meant to embarrass you, but rather to determine
    whether you would be suitable to sit as a juror in this case.]
    The trial will (then/now) proceed as follows: The People may present an
    opening statement. The defense is not required to present an opening
    statement, but if it chooses to do so, it may give it either after the
    People’s opening statement or at the beginning of the defense case. The
    purpose of an opening statement is to give you an overview of what the
    attorneys expect the evidence will show.
    Next, the People will offer their evidence. Evidence usually includes
    witness testimony and exhibits. After the People present their evidence,
    the defense may also present evidence but is not required to do so.
    Because (he/she/they) (is/are) presumed innocent, the defendant[s] (does/
    do) not have to prove that (he/she/they) (is/are) not guilty.
    After you have heard all the evidence and [before] the attorneys (give/
    have given) their final arguments, I will instruct you on the law that
    applies to the case.
    After you have heard the arguments and instructions, you will go to the
    jury room to deliberate.
    New January 2006; Revised June 2007
    BENCH NOTES
    Instructional Duty
    There is no sua sponte duty to give an instruction outlining how the trial will
    proceed. This instruction has been provided for the convenience of the trial judge
    3
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    who may wish to explain the trial process to jurors. See California Rules of Court,

  • oqaxdboesane says:

    Cases that involve suspect classifications are subject to closer scrutiny. The Supreme Court laid out the rationale for this level of scrutiny in a footnote of the case Carolene Products v. United States (1938). Usually, strict scrutiny results in the invalidation of the legislation. In Loving v. Virginia (1967), the Court struck down Virginia’s miscegenation law under strict scrutiny. Korematsu v. United States (1944) in which the Court upheld a military exclusion order against Japanese-Americans during World War II was one of the few cases where legislation passed the strict scrutiny test.

  • azosiyiz says:

    In the 1980s, the Supreme Court started looking at separation of genders in education instead of racial segregation in public schools. The Court’s ruling in Mississippi University of Women v. Hogan (1982) determined that Mississippi’s policy of only allowing females to enroll in the nursing program violated equal protection because women were not disadvantaged when it came to getting nursing jobs. The Supreme Court decided in United States v. Virginia (1996) that Virginia violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying women entry to the Virginia Military Institute while also deciding that a similar program for women was not substantially equal.

  • KdiQuork says:

    The middle tier of review was developed during the 1970s for gender and legitimacy of children. In the early 1900s, the Court saw itself as a protector of women while restricting them from various activities. Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) upheld a state law that did not allow a woman to be a bartender except at a business owned by her husband or father while the Court upheld an automatic exemption for women from jury duty in Hoyt v. Florida (1961) with the justification that women are the center of the family. It was not until 1971 in Reed v. Reed that the Court overturned sex classification legislation when they struck down a state law naming a male heir as the administrator of an estate when none was named in a will finding the state had no rational basis for the law. The Supreme Court went from a rational basis analysis to some of the judges applying strict scrutiny in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) and striking down a law that required female military members to prove their spouses were dependents without requiring male members to do the same. The Court finally settled on an intermediate scrutiny standard in Craig v. Boren (1976) where they struck down a state law that banned 18 to 20 year-old men from buying alcohol while not applying the same restriction to women. The cases that the Supreme Court has decided regarding gender demonstrate that state’s interest needs to have an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”

  • alaanekoraoc says:

    Most issues are only subject to rational review. In Railway Express v. New York (1949), the Supreme Court upheld a New York City ordinance that prohibited advertising on commercial vehicles unless that advertising pertained to the owner’s business. Although the ordinance was underinclusive because it only applied to some vehicles, it passed the rational review test. Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Commissioners (1947) was another case where the Supreme Court upheld a law that in effect prevented anyone except a relative or friend of current riverboat pilots from entering the profession. In some cases, despite the deference given by the rational basis test, laws are still struck down. For instance, in Plyler v. Doe (1982), the Supreme Court struck down the Texas law that denied children of illegal immigrants a public school education. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) involved a challenge to a zoning decision that denied a permit to build a home for the mentally challenged, and the Court struck this down as well due to the substantial harm to the plaintiffs and weak state interest.

  • amanuvulisifu says:

    Equal Protection

    The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of the most litigated sections of the Constitution. Since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court has developed a three-tier analysis approach. Under this system, with a challenged classification, the government has to show that this classification serves a compelling state interest and that the legislation is necessary to serve the interest. Suspect classifications are race, national origin, religion, and alienage unless it falls into the political community exception. The Court also established classifications that burden fundamental rights and would be subject to strict scrutiny, including interstate migration, denial or dilution of voting, access to courts, and other fundamental rights. For the middle tier of scrutiny, the government has to show that the classification serves an important state interest and is at least substantially related to serving the interest. The classifications that fall under the middle tier are gender and illegitimacy. The third tier is minimum or rational basis scrutiny, which applies to the issues that are not covered under the other categories.

  • iebeqadadem says:

    These proposals raise serious constitutional questions, however. Birthright citizenship is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That birthright is protected no less for children of undocumented persons than for descendants of Mayflower passengers.

    The Fourteenth Amendment begins: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” Repeal proponents contend that this language does not apply to the children of aliens – whether legal or illegal (with the possible exception of lawful permanent residents) – because such persons are not “subject to [U.S.] jurisdiction.” But text, history, judicial precedent, and Executive Branch interpretation confirm that the Citizenship Clause reaches most U.S.-born children of aliens, including illegal aliens.

    One might argue that the Constitution’s emphasis on place of birth is antiquated. The requirement that only natural born citizens may serve as President or Vice President has been condemned on similar grounds.[6] But a constitutional amendment is the only way to expand eligibility for the Presidency, and it is likewise the only way to restrict birthright citizenship.[7]

  • roTew says:

    In response to increasing frustration with illegal immigration, lawmakers and activists are hotly debating various proposals to combat incentives to enter the United States outside legal channels. Economic opportunity is the strongest attraction, of course. But another magnet, some contend, is a long-standing provision of U.S. law that confers citizenship upon persons born within our borders.[1]

    There is increasing interest in repealing birthright citizenship for the children of aliens – especially undocumented persons. According to one recent poll, 49 percent of Americans believe that a child of an illegal alien should not be entitled to U.S. citizenship (41 percent disagree).[2] Legal scholars including Judge Richard Posner contend that birthright citizenship for the children of aliens may be repealed by statute.[3] Members of the current Congress have introduced legislation and held hearings,[4] following bipartisan efforts during the 1990s led by now-Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid and others.[5]

  • MrvQuork says:

    http://thefederalist.com/2015/08/25/defining-american-birthright-citizenship-and-the-original-understanding-of-the-14th-amendment/

    Defining ‘American’: Birthright Citizenship And The Original Understanding Of The 14th Amendment
    Stay tuned: Dred Scott II could be coming soon to a federal court near you.

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